very process of its commodification. Thus we read of Balinese dances, designed for tourist consumption, which so captured the imagination of "natives" that they ended up replacing the sacred, auratic originals previously performed only in the temple (Sanger 1988: 99-100) . Observing similar things in China and elsewhere, Phillip Felfan Xie (2003) arrives at an unwitting, counter-intuitive syllogism: that, far from destroying cultural value, the commodification of "tradition," insofar as it valorizes indigeneity, is as likely to be a "positive mechanism in the pursuit of authenticity," a means of finding "true selves," individual and collective, "through the appropriation of pastness." Almost like nationalism -but not quite. For the imagination, here, is propelled less by the conceit of homogeneous inclusion, than by the impetus to produce identification and self-definition through meaningful difference. To echo Źiźek (n.d.), our current worldliness seems to conjure an endless quest for unalienated otherness as its "necessary supplement."
What conclusions may be drawn from all this? Could it be that we are seeing unfold before us a metamorphosis in the production of identity and subjectivity, in the politics and economics of culture, and in the interpellation of indigeneity into worlds beyond itself? Does this imply, concomitantly, a shift in the ontology of ethnic consciousness and the nature of belonging? And why does ethnic genealogy provide an ever more compelling basis for human connectedness and collective life, often seeming more "authentic" than the putative horizontal fraternity that underlies liberal citizenship?
Note that, in posing the problem thus, we treat ethnicity, culture, identity, and indigeneity not as analytic constructs but as signs variously deployed by human beings across the planet in their quotidian efforts to inhabit sustainable worlds.
ETHNICITY, IN THE ONGOING PRESENT: one or two questions of theory
Let us pause briefly here to offer two general observations about cultural identity.
One is ontological, the other, orientational.
First, ontology.
The oldest, most foundational question of all about ethnicity, sui generisethnicity as consciousness, ethnicity as a sociological formation, ethnicity as a sentiment deep enough to die for -is whether it is primordial or an instrumentally-motivated social construction. 10 Happily, this question -which once divided scholars, organic intellectuals, and militias -has receded in significance. Few social scientists would argue any longer for primordialism, pure and simple, although ethno-nationalists continue to kill for it. To many in academia, bromides about ethnicity really being both, part primordial and part social construction, offer a banal compromise, a way of distantiating an intractable problem. In fact, that compromise is itself incoherent, impossible: primordial attachment and the social construction of identity describe irreducibly different ontologies of being that cannot, logically or sociologically, dissolve into each other. Unless, of course, the primordial is treated not as an explanation for ethnic consciousness, but as a phenomenological description of how that consciousness is experienced from within by those who share it (J.L. Comaroff 1996) . More important, for now, however, is the fact that the compromise itself -that ethnicity is part primordial, part social construction -actually mimics an ever more palpable social fact: the great existential irony that, in its lived manifestations, cultural identity is increasingly apprehended, simultaneously, as a function of voluntary self-production and the ineluctable effect of biology. In other words, as both construction and essence. 11 This doubling, we would argue, is not a contradiction at all: it is an endemic condition of identity in neoliberal times. Of which more in due course.
Second, orientation.
It is a matter of observation that, across the positivist social sciences, treatments of cultural identity, where they extend beyond its modes of expression and representation, tend overwhelmingly to orient towards its political dimensions; perhaps this is itself the corollary of the triumph of constructionist perspectives, for which the fabrication of any collective consciousness is, by definition, a political act (cf. Hall 1996:442f) . Which is why politics and identity are so often locked in conceptual embrace, as if each completes the other. So much is this the case that the economics, ethics, and aesthetics of ethnicity are, by extension, almost invariably reduced to a politics: to the pursuit of shared social and material interests (cf. Jung 2001) ; to struggles for recognition in the face of homogenizing hegemonies; to redress for histories, real or imagined, of injury, suffering, victimhood (cf. Brown 1995) ; to the right to engage in "different" bodily and domestic practices, poetics, musics, moralities.
Patently, the politics of ethnicity are critical. All the more so because neoliberal tendencies are commonly said to disperse the political by submerging its ideological bases in the imperatives of economic efficiency and capital growth, in the fetishism of the free market, bioscience, and technology, in the dictates of security and social order, in the demands of "culture" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001) . At the same time, the continued privileging of the politics of ethnicity has a number of costs: it depends on an under-specified conception of the political; it reduces cultural identity to a utility function;
and it confuses the deployment of ethnicity as a tactical claim to entitlement with the substance of ethnic consciousness. Indeed, it is arguable that ethnicity-as-political identity and ethnicity-as-cultural identity are quite different phenomena, despite being conditions of each other's possibility. Ethnicity-as-political identity usually presents its cultural bases not in the "thick" terms of a living, inhabited order of signs and practicesi.e., of ethnicity-as-culture in its anthropological sense -but in the "thin," second-order terms that, purged of density, refer to very general, reified values (cf. Jung 2001:22-4 pushed them toward a more heterodox nationhood (J.L. Comaroff 1996:177) . Hence the growing literatures, scholarly and lay alike, on citizenship, sovereignty, multiculturalism, minority rights, and the limits of liberalism. Hence the xenophobia that haunts heterodoxy almost everywhere. Hence, too, our disciplinary concern with the curious counterpoint between cosmopolitanism and indigeneity, both variously understood.
Hetero-nationhood seeks -usually for pragmatic, not ethical reasons -to accommodate cultural diversity within a civic order composed of universal citizens, all ostensibly equal before the law. And to embrace identity politics within a liberal, constitutionally-founded conception of national community. Especially since 1989, global liberalization has not merely transformed the sovereignty of nation-states. It has actively compounded the degree to which they are both polymorphous and porous: we scarcely need mention, here, the ever more mobile demographics of wage labor; or the incapacity of many
Western cosmo-polities to reproduce their social infrastructures without the discomforting presence of "aliens"; or the impact of the electronic commons on the planetary circulation of virtually everything -and everything virtual. All of which, plainly, are corollaries of the hegemony of the market, of its power both to breach and to buttress borders, to curtail and to extend the regulatory reach of states, to valorize the local and to cast it into economic force-fields well beyond itself. Mark the move here from metaphor to metonym: from the body politic to the politicized body as the fons et origo of concrete social connectedness.
Among these putatively "elemental" bases of human life, ethnicity -which has the potential to found populations of variable scale, from a handful to millions of people -has proven particularly compelling as a principle of similitude, recognition, attachment, consociation, and mobilization; the active components, that is, which together congeal into identity. Like the nation, it is rooted, presumptively, in shared blood, culture, and corporate interest, a conjuncture that seems all the more real as civic nationhood is less able to pass itself off as fictive kinship, to hold difference in check, to subsume it within a political community imagined-as-one, or to confine it to the realm of the private. To the degree that ethnic consciousness has become the socio-semiotic vehicle of cultural diversity, situating it in both the existential (in biology) and the elective (in self-determination), it has emerged as a common language of transaction "in the trading pits of pluralist relativism"that characterize hetero-nationhood (Vanderbilt 1997:140) .
While most people continue to live as citizens in nation-states, they tend more and more only to be conditionally citizens of nation-states. Thus, to return to South Africa, which seems fairly typical in this respect, 12 a recent study shows that less than twenty-five per cent of the population regards itself primarily as South African. The "vast majority...principally think of themselves" as members of "an ethnic, cultural, language, religious, or some other group," to which they "attach their personal fate." At the same time, most of them do not reject their national identity (Gibson 2004) .
complexity. The conditionality of citizenship, the fact that it is overlaid and undercut by a politics of difference, does not necessarily entail the negation of the national subject, merely its uneasy alignment with other priorities. Mostly, the priorities of otherness.
In addition, these developments all involve a stress on legal instruments: on copyright, intellectual property, and the like. The modernist polity has always rested on jural foundations, of course. But, of late, there has been a palpable intensification in the resort to legal ways and means. The signs are everywhere: in the development of a global jurisprudence far more elaborate than its internationalist predecessor; in the epidemic of new national constitutions since 1989; in the proliferation of legal NGOs across the world; in the remarkable spread of human rights advocacy; in the subjection of ever more intimate domains of human life to litigation. People across the planet are being encouraged to behave as homo juralis. And collectivities of all kinds are given ever more reason to mimic bodies corporate (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; 2009) .
There is a critical corollary to all this. It concerns the relocation of politics into the legal domain. More and more are differences of all kinds being fought out in the courtswhether they involve private freedoms, property rights, or national resources, access to medical treatment or title to real estate, sovereignty or cultural knowledge. In ways unthinkable until recently, governments and their agencies, especially those that deal in death and taxes, are regularly sued by their citizens; and citizens are ever more litigious in respect of each other. What once happened in parliaments, street protests, and political councils now finds a new space of contestation. Even history is being re-politicized, redeemed, recouped in the courts. Britain, for one, is being sued by several formerly colonized peoples in East Africa, each demanding restitution for an old wrong: the Nandi, for the killing of their leader in 1905; the Nyoro for a land seizure in 1900; the Samburu for injuries inflicted by relict munitions. In all these class actions, the plaintiff is an ethnic group, reclaiming its past by jural means. And asserting a corporate identity in the process.
14 Project the legal subject onto the terrain of cultural identity, add the reduction of culture to property, mix it with the displacement of politics into the domain of jurisprudence, and what is the result? It is, to return to where we began, "Ethnicity, Inc."
CASINO CAPITAL, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND INCORPORATION
Neither the incorporation of ethnic groups nor the commodification of culture is new. In North America, it has had legal recognition since at least 1934, with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. In1971, moreover, the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act explicitly re-organized indigenous peoples into corporations composed of shareholders whose rights were based on genealogy, whose traditional lands became private, alienable property, and whose cultural products, a growing proportion of them trademarked under brand-names like the 'Silver Hand,' were directed toward the market (Hollowell-Zimmer 2001) . 15 But the popular prototype of Ethnicity, Inc. in the US lies in the Native American casino-owning "tribe," its apotheosis in the Mohegan Sun and the Pequot Foxwood Resort, two enormous monuments to ethno-marketing and the architecture of vernacular kitsch; at Foxwood are found such establishments as Ethnic Concepts International Gift Shop. As it turns out, the Native American cases of ethno-incorporation are bewilderingly complex; their identity economies stretch far beyond the gaming house. But most of them share five things that will turn out to be significant as we proceed.
The first is obvious: the more like profit-seeking corporations indigenous groups become, the more the terms of membership privilege birth, blood, and biology over social or cultural attachments. And the more they tend to be contested. 16 The second, by contrast, is counter-intuitive: not infrequently, it is commercial enterprise that begets an ethnic group, not the other way around. Vide the Pomo Indians -Pomo in both name and spirit -that, in the 1950s, consisted of two families, without tribe or territory. These families lived on land set aside for homeless Native Americans until they secured reservation land and a casino licence. Whereupon they became "the" Pomo. Or better yet, the case of the Augustine Cahuilla Indians, who consist of one woman, Maryann
Martin, but who have been allowed to open a gaming house on an abandoned reservation in California. By these means does Ms. Martin constitute a certified ethnic group. Nor is she the only one-person ethno-corporation in North America.
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The third notable thing about the US cases is that, in many of them, the creation of a corporate ethno-economy has been set in motion by venture capital from outside.
Its source is usually non-Indian financiers, for whom real or virtual "tribes" are franchises licenced to make a killing. Finally, the Indian cases indicate that ethno-incorporation strives for geo-spatial materiality. 20 To be sure, it often involves a land claim. Which is not surprising: real estate held in patrimonial tenure -territory, that is -is typically taken to be a founding principle of sovereignty. Note these five points. They will, we repeat, turn out to be critical.
The prototypical Native American instances of Ethnicity, Inc., those associated with casino ownership, presumed a cultural identity at their core. But the substance of that identity was incidental to their incorporation. There are exceptions to this. Or rather, inversions: "tribes" whose corporate history began not with casino capitalismthe copyrighting of their cultures. Take the Zia Pueblo (Brown 1998:197) , who successfully sued New Mexico a few years back for the unauthorized use of their sun symbol on state flags. The design, with its spiritual powers, they said, was their holy-owned property. Or, also in New Mexico, the Indians of Sandoval county who, over centuries, developed a ritually-valued variety of blue corn that, in the 1980s, became a fashionable health food. As a result, Five Sandoval Indian Pueblos, Inc. was established to superintend the sale of trademarked agri-goods, like "Hopi Blue" (Pinel and Evans 1994:45) . Here, in sum, an ethno-corporation arose from distilling local knowledge into a brand that, in turn, sedimented sociologically into an ethnic federation; just the thing Chanock pointed to in saying that "sustainable cultures are those which brand best"(above, p.5).
The branding of culture has been facilitated by an implosion, in recent times, in the domain of intellectual property: in the laws governing its possession, the rights accruing to it, and the spheres of existence over which it extends. This has persuaded the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organization to recognize an "inherent" right of indigenous peoples to the fruits of their vernacular knowledge (see e.g. 
ETHNO-FUTURES, AGAIN
The first takes us to the edge of the Kahalari Desert, to the Land of the Sanknown, pejoratively, as Bushmen. It involves the hoodia cactus, xhoba, which they have imbibed since time immemorial. In the past, when hunting in the desert, it stayed their appetites and thirst; it is used these days to stave off the effects of poverty. San give political shape to, and claim sovereignty for, their ethnic aspirations (Evans ibid:14) .
Richard Dixey may have been disingenuous in asserting the extinction of the San; the advantages to Phytofarm were plain enough. When the San Council protested to the CSIR, it acknowledged the error of its ways, Dixey confessed his "embarrassment," and a profit sharing agreement was signed. Since then, Pfizer has given way as licencee to Unilever. Since then, too, the San Trust, set up to manage the incoming funds, has received its first royalties, has begun to tackle the problems of distribution among the San peoples of South Africa, Nambia, and Botswana, and has filed suit against twenty-six illicit producers. Since then "the San," as an ethno-corporation has taken ever more articulate shape.
In point of fact, Dixey had not been altogether wrong. The San may not have been extinct, but their ethnocide had gone a long way. Having been cast out of their social ecology, "they" did not evince much by way of a collective identity; their dispersal into the gray racial space of South Africa made it impossible to do so. But the assertion of intellectual property -coupled, significantly, with the land claim that preceded itreanimated San "identity." And gave it ever "thicker," more dense substance; a symptom of this, interestingly, being a sudden increase in people accusing each other, on biological grounds, of "not being real San ." 26 Thus it is that there has been a language revival, that genealogies are being collected to create a population register; that SASI has initiated a "cultural resources management project"; that programs have been designed for "San-controlled income generation" using indigenous knowledge in a sustainable manner; that a legal platform has been set up to protect the global interests and dignity of the San. All of which had the effect of re-indigenizing this "people" through the very act of interpellating them into a distinctly cosmopolitan sense of being-in-the-world. When we asked Roger Chennells whether a new ethnic identity had been produced in the process, he answered in the affirmative. He is correct. In fact, the presumption that "the" San actually had a shared identity-or a coherent ethno-sociology -prior to the colonial dispersal of a complex population of hunter-gatherers collectively called "Bushmen,"is itself contentious: who or what "they"
were has long been a subject of bitter debate. 27 But that does not matter any more, at least not outside of the academy. Today they are a multi-national, ever more assertively cosmopolitan ethno-corporation: as we said, "the" San, and the San Council that makes manifest their sovereignty, now straddle three of the countries of southern Africa.
The other story involves the Bafokeng, the people made wealthy by platinum, the people whose kings are spoken of as CEOs, the people actually referred to in South Africa as Bafokeng, Inc. 28 The history of their incorporation begins, long ago, with land:
one of their nineteenth century chiefs realized that, to protect their territory from white settlers, his people ought to purchase it outright (Cook n.d. [a] :5-6). So he sent young men to the diamond fields and commissioned their wages to buy as much real estate as possible. The subsequent history of South Africa did not make it easy to hold on to this land. But, by establishing the Bafokeng as a private, corporate owner, the purchase enabled their chiefs to defend it from seizure (Cook ibid.:6 et passim), especially after the discovery of platinum in 1924 and its leasing to Impala Platinum, a large company, in the 1960s. 29 The greatest challenge, in this respect, came when the puppet homeland government of Bophuthatswana, set up by the apartheid state, exiled the chief of the Bafokeng, expropriated their mineral rights, and negotiated contracts directly with Impala; this sparked a lengthy series of legal actions which eventually yielded a victory for the "tribe" in 1999 -and, with it, a lucrative profit-sharing arrangement. What is missing in all this? The cultural element of Bafokeng cultural identity.
King Leruo and his money managers have long presented themselves as highly cosmopolitan business people primarily concerned with a sustainable future: Vision 2020 is their ambitious plan to develop Bafokeng into a "self-sufficient,"fully employed, globally-oriented nation by, well, 2020 (Gray 2003:13-14) . Of late, however, there has been much more culture talk, much more talk of indigeneity. Since being installed in a ritual saturated with the trappings of a tradition partly historical, partly made up, powerfully vernacular, the young king has taken to essaying "African values," to celebrating "traditional governance,"and to arguing that, in moving toward "Afro-modernity," his people must "affirm" their essence (see Gray ibid:14 ; the king has also hired a personal consultant with a PhD in anthropology). In short, Bafokeng, Inc, the manifest commodification of Bafokeng identity, appears to be reaching toward a cultural sensibility in order to complete itself.
Running the San and Bafokeng together, then, the dialectic at the heart of Ethnicity, Inc. reveals itself. Each of these cases evinces the five things foreshadowed in Native America, if in different proportions: membership in both has come to be defined genealogically, with some contestation either evident or imminent; in both, commercial enterprise has been instrumental either in crystallizing or in reproducing the sociological entity in which cultural identity is presumed to inhere; in both, venture capital and legal expertise from outside has been crucial; both have asserted their new-found sovereignty against the state; and both have based their incorporation on land claims, past or present. In both, moreover, the displacement of the political into the legal has been demonstrable: both have fought their battles by means of lawfare. In the process, they have both naturalized the trope of identity around which their "rights"
adhere -and interpellated into it a significant measure of affect. This is particularly striking in the case of the San. It is arguable that knowledge of the hoodia was produced not by "the San" at all -who may or may not existed at the time -but by hunters of the Kalahari, a class defined by their relationship to a mode of production. The projection of a vernacular right to intellectual property onto "the San," a putatively "primordial" collectivity, has the effect of extinguishing a class of producers as it distinguishes and materializes a cultural identity -and, as it does so, giving ontological primacy to the idea of identity itself. Thus, to reiterate, does ideology become ID-ology and hide itself in a sense of the natural, the inevitable, the given.
Most of all, though, the stories of the San and the Bafokeng, precisely because they are such extreme instances, demonstrate how and why it is that Ethnicity, Inc.
rests on a dialectic between the incorporation of identity and the commodification of culture; and, at another level, between indigeneity and the human cosmopolis. Whether it starts with the incorporation of identity, as in the Bafokeng case, or with the commodification of cultural property, as in Kalahari, the process evinces a drive to complete itself in the other. Thus it is that a dispersed group of former hunters and gatherers have become, ever more explicitly,"the San," replete with a sovereign sense of their own ethno-sociology, their own governance, their own affective economy, their own range of institutions to make it all real. Thus it is that Bafokeng, Inc is turning to vernacular ways and means in the name of an Afro-modernity which it may inhabit as it reaches toward the future. Neither is fortuitous. After all, Ethnicity, Inc., to the degree that it naturalizes collective right, material entitlement, and sovereignty, does require both the incorporation of identity and cultural substance to realize, recognize, fulfill itself.
Which is why it tends to begin in land, thence to make claims to sovereignty, to secure its cultural property, and to invest in the long-run. The future of ethnicity does seem to lie, at least in one important respect, in ethno-futures.
CONCLUSION
We have come not to praise to Ethnicity, Inc. Nor do we extol empowerment that depends on the commodification of culture or the Empire of the Market, let alone the creeping judicialization of politics or the naturalization of the ethno-trope of identity into a brute term of social being. Quite the opposite. Ethnicity, Inc. carries with it a host of costs and contradictions. What we seek to do here, in short, is to interrogate a world-wide phenomenon in the making; one that is much more complicated than it first appears.
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